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since the evidence introduced was reliable despite the fact that it had
been illegally seized.
At least two courts have concluded that under the Linkletter holding,
Escobedo should be applied only prospectively." A contrary view was
expressed by Judge Forman in his opinion on the Petition for Rehearing
in Russo.21 Justice Black, dissenting in In Re Groban,' noted that
"[T]he right to use counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing when,
for all practical purposes the conviction is assured by pretrial examination."2 Escobedo remedied this factor by extending the right to counsel
to the accusatory stage of the proceedings. The purpose of this extension
was to insure protection of the constitutional rights of the accused so that
he may not be denied a fundamentally fair trial. The Court in Linkletter
noted that retrospective application has been given to three recent
decisions involving constitutionally protected rights.24 That Court stated
that ".

.

. in each of the three areas in which we have applied our rule

retrospectively the principle went to the fairness of the trial-the very
integrity of the fact finding process."2 One of the cases referred to by the
Court was Gideon v. Wainwright26 which guaranteed the accused the
right of counsel at the trial. Escobedo is a logical extension of this right
to the pretrial interrogation. As Judge Forman in Russo concluded, the
pretrial interrogation also affects the "very integrity of the fact finding
process." It would seem, therefore, that the correct application of Linkletter to the rule in Escobedo would require that that decision be applied
retrospectively.
Steven K. Yablonski

LAw-Right to Counsel-The right to counsel attaches
at an accusatorial proceeding even though not requested. The rule announced in Escobedo v. Illinois will not be applied retrospectively to cases
finally adjudicated before Escobedo v. Illinois was decided.
CONSTITUTIONAL

Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965).
May all those incarcerated in a Pennsylvania penal institution who had
their cases finally adjudicated prior to June 22, 1964, and had been denied
the right of counsel before trial, rest in peace. Their hopes of gaining
freedom under the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois' have vanished with the
20. United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965).
21. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, supra note 3.
22. 352 U.S. 330 (1956).
23. Id. at 345.
24. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 16, at 628, n.13.
25. Id. at 639.
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Negri.2
Since the case of Gideon v. Wainwright,' which held that the accused
must be afforded counsel in all state criminal trials, the trend has been
to expand the scope of this fundamental right. Thus, in Escobedo v.
Illinois4 the Supreme Court held that the right of counsel attaches when
police activity ceases to be investigatory and becomes accusatorial, and
that the accused must be informed of his right to remain silent. Petitioner
Negri in the instant case sought to further expand this fundamental right,
to have the rule of Escobedo applied retrospectively, and thus to have
his conviction reversed.
In Commonwealth v. Negri5 the petitioner was suspected of a murder
in the Philadelphia area. The Pennsylvania police, relying on an informer,
traveled to New York and there along with the New York police, entered
the petitioner's hotel room. The police, without a warrant, placed him
under arrest, and searched both his room and clothing. Later a warrant
was issued and Negri was formally arrested and charged with murder. The
police then began their interrogation in the hope of obtaining a confession
to the Philadelphia murder. While under questioning, petitioner did not
request nor was he informed of his right to counsel, or of his right to
remain silent. At Negri's trial a confession made during the interrogation
and without counsel was admitted in evidence. On June 17, 1963, Negri
was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed an appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and that
court affirmed his conviction on March 17, 1964.6 Three months thereafter the Supreme Court of the United States decided Escobedo v.
Illinois;7 petitioner Negri, advocating the retrospective application of
Escobedo, sought a reversal of his conviction.
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Eagen, denied petitioner's
request for a retrospective application of Escobedo, but did give a new
interpretation of Escobedo as far as Pennsylvania law was concerned. In
reviewing their previous interpretation of Escobedo the court found that
they had understood it to be:
...where a person in police custody is not warned of his constitutional right to remain silent during the accusatorial interrogation, it is necessary that he then be given assistance of counsel
to protect that right, if such assistance is requested.8
2. 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Supra note 1.
Supra note 2.
Commonwealth v. Negri, 414 Pa. 21, 198 A.2d 595 (1964).
Supra note 1.
Commonwealth v. Negri, supra note 2, at 671.
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The court, however, recognized that the other jurisdictions had interpreted
Escobedo as affording counsel to the accused at accusatory proceedings
even if not requested.9 Cognizant of the different interpretations of
Escobedo, the court noted that four petitions ° advocating one of the
various interpretations of Escobedo were appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States and in all four instances certiorari was denied, thus
leaving the law in hopeless confusion. Consequently, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court proceeded to determine what the law would be in Pennsylvania by examining the recent decisions of United States ex rel. Russo
v. New Jersey and United States ex rel. Bisignano v. New Jersey." There
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held,
according to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
...that no request by the accused is necessary to impose upon
the interrogating police the duty to furnish the assistance of
counsel .

.

. in the absence of a warning to remain silent or an

intelligent and understanding waiver. 2

The court, recognizing that Pennsylvania law should conform to the mandate of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, said that ".

.

. the decision of

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is on this matter, for all practical
purposes, the ultimate forum in Pennsylvania."'"
Having adopted this new interpretation of Escobedo as the law in
Pennsylvania, the court proceeded to deal with the problem of whether
Escobedo should be applied retrospectively to convictions finally adjudicated prior to June 22, 1964. The court recognized that while some recent
decisions involving constitutional rights have been held to apply retrospectively,'1 4 those cases applied to ". . . fundamental right[s], the denial
of which [were] likely to allow the conviction of an innocent man."' 5 The
instant case, the court concluded, did not deal with such a crucial right
and therefore would not be held retrospective, consistent with the decision
9. Id. at 672.
10. Compare People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937 (1965), with Illinois v. Hartgraves, 31 III. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964),
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1965); and United States v. Guerra, 334 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 936 (1964), with United States ex rel. Townsend v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d
837 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965).
11. 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
12. Commonwealth v. Negri, supra note 2, at 672.
13. Ibid.
14. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1965) (requiring states to furnish transcripts of
the trial to indigents on appeal),; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring
the appointment of counsel in all state felony trials); and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964) (requiring a preliminary determination of the voluntariness of a confession
before the jury can hear it).
15. Commonwealth v. Negri, supra note 2, at 675.
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in Linkletter v. Walker. 6 In so doing the court had to cope with the
problem of the retrospective application of Escobedo in the decision of
United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey,17 since the court had adopted
the Court of Appeals opinion as far as the interpretation of Escobedo
was concerned. In dealing with this perplexing problem of adopting only
part of a controlling decision and refusing to adopt the Court of Appeals
view on Escobedo's retrospective application, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that:
while the inter-systematic problems which were presented by
that decision [Russo] prompted us to change our position regarding the necessity of a "request" for the assistance of counsel,
we cannot defer to the position which was undiscussed and only
inferentially applied by the Third Circuit.'
In denying the application of Escobedo retrospectively, the case of
Linkletter v. Walker,'9 which held that Mapp v. Ohio"° would not be
applied retrospectively, became the guiding light for the Pennsylvania
Court. The court concluded that, barring any coerced confession, 2 ' the
proceedings against Negri were like those against Linkletter, i.e., neither
case involved errors sufficiently prejudicial as to violate any "fundamental" rights of the respective petitioners.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach indicates a recognition
of the hardships and possible chaos which would follow if Escobedo was
to be applied retrospectively. The court examined the problem on what
they thought to be a more practical basis than a concern for the fundamental rights of the accused. The fear of overcrowded courtrooms and
of wholesale releasing of incarcerated criminals, dominated the thinking
of the court. As a result, instead of overworking the judiciary, the court
decided to "overimprison" those who were unfortunate enough to have
had their unconstitutional convictions affirmed prior to June 22, 1964.
Thus, this decision coupled with that of Linkletter "....

seems to abandon

once and for all the Blackstonian concept that judges do not make, but
merely discover, the law, and that overruled decisions were never the
law, but merely erroneously declared concepts." 2
It seems strange that Negri, by committing his crime in December,
1961, should be denied his constitutional rights, while Escobedo by
16. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
17. Supra note 11.
18. Commonwealth v. Negri, supra note 2, at 676.
19. Supra note 16.
20. 367 U.S. 643'(1961).
21. However, the court did remand the case to an independent hearing to determine
if the confession was coerced applying the principles of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964).
22. Commonwealth v. Negri, supra note 2, at 672-673.
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committing his crime in January, 1960, was afforded the very same rights
denied to Negri. For such an invidious result Negri may thank the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the speedy criminal court procedures
of Pennsylvania, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court feels should not
be "slowed down" by the new trials of those incarcerated victims who
were denied their constitutional rights. Furthermore, the court seems
oblivious to the fact that a confession obtained at an accusatorial proceeding is just as damaging as a confession at the trial level. Also it is not
reasonable to assume that the right to counsel at a trial is more "fundamental" than at an accusatorial proceeding, since a confession at the
accusatorial proceeding may for all practical purposes nullify the benefit
of counsel at the trial level.
Thus, in the final analysis, the court has adopted the Russo view of
Escobedo, requiring the police to afford counsel in an accusatory pre-trial
proceeding whether counsel is requested or not and thus by necessity
concedes that Negri was denied his constitutional rights. Yet, by refusing
to apply Escobedo retrospectively, they deny him a remedy.2 4
Joseph Pass, Jr.

TORTs-Parental Immunity-New Hampshire has now joined the trend
toward the abolition of the parental immunity doctrine.
Dean v. Smith,-

N.H.

-, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).

In June of this year the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Dean v.
Smith,' had occasion to re-evaluate the parental immunity doctrine. The
case arose out of an automobile accident, in which the father was killed
and his three unemancipated children were severely injured. It was
subsequently determined that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the father. A suit was brought against the father's estate by the
mother of the children to (1) enforce her own claim for medical, hospital
and nursing expenses incurred on behalf of the children, and (2) to
enforce the personal injury claims of each minor child.2 This presented a
question to the court of whether or not an unemancipated child could
maintain a suit in negligence against his parent.
The defendant Smith (the personal representative of the deceased
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

24. There was a dissenting opinion filed by Mr. Justice Roberts and joined by Mr.
Justice Musmanno in which they advocated that the denial of the right to counsel in the
accusatory pre-trial investigation was a denial of a fundamental right which is a direct
prejudice against a fair trial and thus Escobedo should be applied retrospectively.
1. -

N.H. -,

211 A.2d 410 (1965).

2. The car was insured under an effective policy of general coverage.

